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Abstract
Collaborative Data Mining facilitates multiple organizations to integrate their datasets
and extract useful knowledge from their joint datasets for mutual benefits. The knowl-
edge extracted in this manner is found to be superior to the knowledge extracted lo-
cally from a single organization’s dataset. With the rapid development of outsourcing,
there is a growing interest for organizations to outsource their data mining tasks to a
cloud environment to effectively address their economic and performance demands.
However, due to privacy concerns and stringent compliance regulations, organizations
do not want to share their private datasets neither with the cloud nor with other par-
ticipating organizations. In this paper, we address the problem of outsourcing as-
sociation rule mining task to a federated cloud environment in a privacy-preserving
manner. Specifically, we propose a privacy-preserving framework that allows a set
of users, each with a private dataset, to outsource their encrypted databases and the
cloud returns the association rules extracted from the aggregated encrypted databases
to the participating users. Our proposed solution ensures the confidentiality of the out-
sourced data and also minimizes the users’ participation during the association rule
mining process. Additionally, we show that the proposed solution is secure under the
standard semi-honest model and demonstrate its practicality.
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With the rapid growth of processing and storage technologies, internet enabled organiza-
tions and companies store massive amounts of data. Thus, the amount of data in the world
doubles every 20 months and the size and number of databases are increasing too [1].
However, extracting useful information becomes more challenging because of the huge
amount of data. This technological trend has enabled the realization of a new computing
model of cloud computing, where all resources are provided as utilities to end users [2].
NIST’s definition of cloud computing: cloud computing is a model for enabling conve-
nient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources
(e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction [3]. There are
many technologies that are working together to give us an overview of the cloud.
• Service Models There are different types of service models. The following are the
most popular models [4]:
– Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
IaaS is a form of cloud computing that provides virtualization resources such
as storage, network, and server. IaaS provider also provides other services to
accompany those infrastructure components. These can include detailed billing,
monitoring, log access, security, as well as storage resiliency, such as backup,
replication, and recovery. IaaS is more cost-efficient because the business does
not have to buy, manage, and support the underlying infrastructure. Examples
are EC2, GCE, and Azure.
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– Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS)
PaaS is a cloud computing model in which the cloud service provider offers
hardware and software tools for the end user to employ them for application
development over the Internet. Some examples of PaaS are Google App Engine
and Microsoft Windows Azure.
– Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
SaaS is a cloud computing model in which the cloud service provider offers
host applications over the Internet and makes it available to the consumer. The
main benefit of SaaS is to remove the need for the organizations or companies
to install the applications on their own computers.
– Data Mining as a Service (DMaaS)
DMaaS is a software and computing infrastructure that allows interactive min-
ing of scientific data in the cloud. It enables users to used cloud for advancing
data analyses.
• Enabling Technologies
Utility computing is one of the fundamental concepts of cloud computing. CPU,
memory, and storage are provided to the end user as a utility service. The end-user
pays for the utilities that are consumed [4].
• Important Features of Cloud Service Providers
There are many components that are provided from Cloud Service Providers (CSPs)
like Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS) and Platform as
a Service (PaaS) to business organizations or individuals. In addition, there are many
cloud service providers available these days. The consumer selects CSP to depend
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on many criteria such as its requirements, budget, and security. This section presents
important factors before consumer selects CSP [4].
– Reliability
Businesses are concerned about reliability because when service goes down, an
outage can impact the business significantly. So, the cloud storage service level
agreement specifies the level of reliability like 99.99999% availability. Also,
they should be concerned about the time for recovery and how CSP will protect
the data
– Customer Support Services
Support services are important factors since the consumer needs support ser-
vices available at all times. When the organization requires support services in
any situation, 24/7 real-time support for solving any problem is essential.
– Security
The disadvantage of moving to a cloud service is that it is less secure. Secu-
rity can be compromised when cloud service providers do not have successful
control over malware and threat protection, encryption techniques, government
rules and regulations etc.
– Manageability
Cloud service providers should make managing the server for deployment easy
to attract its users. So, the ability to manage the system for a long time is an
important factor in selecting a CSP.
• Data Mining in Cloud
Data mining in cloud is a process of extracting structure information from unstruc-
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tured or semi-structured data sources and finding helpful patterns or relationships in
a group with a massive amount of data and gain knowledge of the pattern [5]. There
are some techniques that are used in cloud for data mining, here we discus some of
them:
– Clustering is a process of making similar abstract objects into classes of similar
features, so each class can be treated as one group. This type of technique can
be used on market research, pattern recognition, and data analysis [6].
– Classification is a process of discovering a model that characterizes and identi-
fies data classes and concepts such as finding low/ high value [7].
– Association Rules is a process of focusing on finding interesting relations be-
tween items in massive amount of data. It plays the important part of shopping
basket to predict customer behavior. For example, if a customer buys eggs, he
is 80% likely to purchases bread [8].
– Regression is a technique for predicting range of numeric values or outcome.
For example, using regression to predict the cost of a product [5].
1.2 Motivation
Most organizations today use cloud environments for storage and data processing. For us-
ing the full features of cloud computing, external cloud providers transfer, process, store,
and retrieve the data. Data owners are very concerned about confidentiality, integrity, se-
curity, and techniques of mining the data from the cloud, so they are very suspicious of
placing their data outside their own control [9]. Thus, one of the main issues is that the
server of the cloud provider has access to the data and that may affect the privacy of sensi-
tive information such as looking at the transaction database; this can indicate the products
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purchased, and the most frequent item-set, and then know the mined encrypted patterns,
which is called Association rule mining [9].
In marketing, users can benefit from data mining as they increase their profits by sharing
and analyzing results with other users to gain a large sample size of transactions. Thus,
the results will be more accurate. This type of information requires more privacy. Our
approach confirms that the association rules remain secure when the owners of data used a
federated cloud to outsource their encrypted data. Homomorphic encryption is applied on
our framework, which is based on computing over encrypted data to ensure confidentiality.
Thus, the data owners first outsource their encrypted data to a federated cloud. Then,
the federated cloud securely computes the frequent item-set and association rules mining
within collaborative cloud environment while minimizing users’ intervention. Then, the
federated cloud returns the correct results to end users. So, our proposed model is more
secure than existing models.
1.3 Problem Setting
Our proposed model is based on two types of entities: U1. . . . . . , Un which indicates n data
owners because our framework is a multi-tenant environment, and C1, C2 which indicate
cloud service providers which are implementing collaborative computations on encrypted
data. Each user Ui has a transactional database, indicated by T1, T2. . . , Tn. Encrypted
transactions indicated by Epk(T1), Epk(T2). . . , Epk(Tn) which is sent by each user Ui to
cloud. Figure 1 presents our model. In our approach, unauthorized users and cloud servers
cannot have access to original data. Also, we suppose that the two cloud service providers
are semi-honest (or honest-but-curious), which means all of them accurately follow the
protocol using its correct input. The semi-honest model is more efficient than those under
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Figure 1: Proposed Model
the malicious adversary model [10]. First, each data owner has to encrypt their database
and then outsource it to a federated cloud environment. Then, C1 and C2 securely compute
the frequent item-sets and association rule mining based on a homomorphic encryption
technique, which means securely computing the result and sending it to end user Ui. Thus,
our proposed model focuses on: (a) the federated cloud securely computing the frequent
item-sets over encrypted database of different users, and (b) the federated cloud securely
computing the association rules mining and returning the correct result to end users.
1.4 Main Contributions
The most important contributions of our model are:
• Data Confidentiality: cloud servers and an unauthorized user cannot have access to
user’s database.
• Correct Result: our algorithm returns correct results of the association rule mining
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to the end users and this result is same as the result of the standard algorithm.
• Reduced User’s Participation: users do not need to stay online until the mining
process is finished. When the users send their encrypted database to the cloud, it
securely computes the frequent item-sets and association rules mining and returns
the result to them. Thus, it minimizes user intervention.
1.5 Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of related
work in the same area. Section 3 presents preliminary techniques of our protocol. Section 4
explains our proposed approach. Section 5 describes the implementation and experimental
results. Section 6 concludes and discusses future work.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Association Rule Mining
There are some approaches proposed for performing association rule mining on the data
in the cloud. Wong et al. [11] proposed one to n items mapping by adding fake items into
transactions database. That means, the data owner adds fake items F to the dictionary and
then maps each item x to random subset of F . Thus, the server cannot easily find out the
distribution of the correct item-sets in the database. This approach has two weaknesses:
first, the probability of adding fake items to each transaction is the same. Thus, the fake
transactions will appear in a large database with similar frequencies; second, the fake items
added to transactions independently of the items are already present, and thus with some
calculations the fake items can be removed and the true items can be identified. Another
approach is proposed by Tai et al. [12]. The basic idea of this approach is based on K-
support anonymity to protect each sensitive item with k−1 on the database and other items
with the same support value. Thus, each transformed item cannot be identified from at least
k−1 other items. This approach used pseudo taxonomy tree to limit the occurrence of fake
items. Their used K-support anonymity to protect the sensitive information.
2.2 Privacy Preserving Data Mining in Cloud
There are some approaches proposed for privacy preserving data mining in cloud. Based
on the K-support anonymity idea, Ginannotti et al. [13] proposed a model that extended
the concept of K-support anonymity to K-privacy. So, each transformed item-set cannot be
identified from at least k−1 other item-sets with the same size. To achieve K-privacy, there
were three steps. First, they used one to one mapping approach for replacing plain items.
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Second, they put items on groups for K-privacy. Third, they added fake transactions.
Recently, Xun Yi et al. [14] proposed techniques for protecting the outsource data and
association rules mined. These techniques are K-anonymity, K-support, and K-privacy.
After data owner outsource, his/her encrypted data to cloud, data owner sends the task to
n ≥ 2 semi-honest servers to do association rule mining on encrypted data and return the
encrypted result to the user. This solution is based on distributed ELGamal cryptosystem
to reach the privacy of item, transaction, and database. The weakness of this solution
is the possibility of compromising all servers [14]. Also, Xun Yi et al. proposed three
techniques: association rule mining on encrypted item-set with item privacy, association
rule mining with transaction privacy, association rule mining with data privacy. Here, we
discuss them in details.
1. Association Rule Mining on Encrypted Item-set with Item Privacy
To compute the association rule mining, the user first chooses the minimum number
of threshold and support to send them to the database server. Then, applying an Apri-
ori algorithm on the encrypted transaction database, based on threshold and support
values; encrypted association rules mining is returned to the user. The limitation of
this method is that the database server knows the minimum support and threshold, so
it does not remain secure [14].
2. Association Rule Mining with Transaction Privacy
In this solution, the client sends to a DM server the minimum encrypted value of
support. This solution ignored confidence. It assumed that the DM server and n DM
servers collaborate together to mine all the encrypted frequent item-sets and return
to the client encrypted supports. After decryption, the client will have strong asso-
ciation rules that satisfy the minimum supports and confidence [14]. To build noisy
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transactions, the DM servers choose and encrypt some items and then put these en-
crypted items into the noisy transaction. This way is difficult to remove the effect of
noisy transactions without decryption with minimum frequent item-sets. To get a list
of encrypted items, the DB server and the n DM servers participate to anonymize the
dictionary of all possible items. By using the same item identification algorithms, the
encrypted items in the transaction database are replaced with encrypted items in the
dictionary, but the content of the original transaction is not changed. Then, it applies
the Apriori algorithm on encrypted the item-set. Thus, the original transactions and
noisy transactions are mixed together. This technique has item and transaction pri-
vacy but it leaks some information about the original transaction because of the item
identification algorithm, so it is not secure [14].
3. Association Rule Mining with Data Privacy
This method makes the database server divide the database into n subsets. After
computing the frequent item-set, it returns the result to the user if the result is 1,
which means there is a frequent item-set. If it is zero, there is no frequent item-set.
This solution leaks some information about frequent item-sets [14].
In our paper, we focus on the problem of outsourcing the association rule mining task to a
federated cloud environment because most previous solutions make the result of mined rule
shared with other parties. Thus, the difference between our solution and previous solutions
is that the basic information and mined result stay secure and private to the end user and




The Apriori algorithm developed by [15] is a big achievement in the history of association
rules mining. It is the most well-known association rule algorithm. The Apriori algorithm
generates the candidate item-sets to be counted in a pass by using only the large item-
sets found in the previous pass without looking at the transactions in the database. This
algorithm uses the property of a large item-set having to be a large item-set for any subset
[15].
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic Encryption is a method of encryption that uses computation on encrypted
data without decrypting them first. We will focus on two efficient schemes. First, the El-
Gamal scheme is a public-key encryption algorithm based on the Diffie–Hellman key ex-
change [16]. Second, the Pailler scheme has homomorphic Addition propriety that means
the product of two cipher-texts will decrypt to the sum of their corresponding plain-texts.
Also, it has Homomorphic Multiplication of plain-texts that means an encrypted plaintext
raised to the power of another plaintext will decrypt to the product of the two plain-texts.
However, given the Paillier encryptions of two values, there is no way to compute an en-
cryption of the product of these values without knowing the private key [16].
3.2.1 Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier cryptosystem is an additive homomorphic and a probabilistic asymmetric algo-
rithm for public key cryptography [17]. Suppose Epk is the encryption function with public
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key pk given by (N, g), where N is a product of two large primes, and g is in Z∗N2 . Also, the
decryption function with secret key sk is Dsk. For given a, b ∈ ZN , the Paillier encryption
scheme offer the following properties:
• Homomorphic Addition
Epk(a+ b) ← Epk(a) • Epk(b) mod N2
• Homomorphic Multiplication
Epk(ab) ← Epk(a)b mod N2
3.3 Cryptographic Primitives
• Secure Multiplication
In this protocol, (Epk(a), Epk(b)) is considered as private input of a party P1 and
outputs Epk(a • b) to P1, where a and b are not known to P1 and P2. In this process,
no information regarding a and b is leaked to P1 or P2. The final output Epk(a • b)
is known only to P1 [18]. The basic idea of SM protocol is based on the following
property for any given a, b ∈ZN : a • b = (a+ ra) • (b+ rb)–a • rb–b • ra–ra • rb
• Secure Comparison
In this protocol, P1 has encryption value of a and b and P2 has the secret key. Now,
P1 and P2 have to apply a secure comparison. Suppose we have ((a) ≥ (b)) as a
condition. After applying SC, if the output is one, that means the condition is true. If





In the beginning, the users securely outsourced their transaction database using randomiza-
tion approach where each user Ui randomized each item x and send the values to C1 and C2
such that x = x1+x2 mod N . Thus, the user Ui sends the random value x1 to C1 and x2 to
C2. When C2 receives its random value x2, it will encrypt and send it to C1. Then, C1 using
secure addition, which uses the additive homomorphic property of Paillier Cryptosystem
to combine the received value with its random value x1 to find the encrypted value of x by
this equation: Epk(x1) • Epk(x2) = Epk(x1 + x2 mod N) = Epk(x). At this time, only
C1 knows the encrypted transaction database and threshold (α) that is sent by the user to it.
The value of (α) represents the minimum value of support. The support value determines
the number of times the rule is applied to a given data set. The importance of calculation
support is to avoid rules that have low value of support because these rules might happen by
chance. Our proposed model contains two main phases: (a) secure computation of frequent
item-sets, and (b) secure computation of association rules mining and returning results to
end user. We discuss these two phases in the details on following section.
4.2 Secure Computation of Frequent Item-sets
Now, after we have encrypted data and the value of threshold (α) from user, C1 can securely
compute the frequent item-set based on the addition property of Paillier cryptosystem. For
example, suppose we have item i1 and i2 in the transactions, and they have these values
(1,0,1), (0,1,1). Then, C1 uses secure addition for all values of i1, Epk(1) •Epk(0) •Epk(1)
equal to Epk(1 + 0 + 1), the result will be 2 for both i1 and i2. After that, C1 and C2
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collaborate to do secure comparison with the threshold (α). If the result equal or greater
than threshold (α), 1 will be sent to C1, else 0 will be sent. In our example, assume that
(1,1) are sent to C1. Then, C1 and C2 collaborate to do secure multiplication of the values
of the pair (i1, i2): (1 • 0), (0 • 1), (1 • 1) and then C1 computes the result using secure
addition again. Finally, using the secure comparison protocol [19], if the result is greater
than or equal to (α), (i1, i2) will be added to the frequent item-sets. All of the steps in our
proposed solution are mentioned in algorithm 1. Here, we will discuss an example of how
to compute frequent item-set. Suppose we have sample transaction database D:
Table 1: Sample Transaction Database
i1 i2 i3 i4
T1 0 0 0 1
T2 1 0 1 0
T3 1 0 1 0
T4 1 1 1 1
Assume that the user Ui sets the value of threshold (α) to 2. First, computing the frequent
K-itemsets by using Secure Additive property of Paillier cryptosystem:
• i1 = Epk(0) • Epk(1) • Epk(1) • Epk(1)
= Epk(0 + 1 + 1 + 1)
= Epk(3)
• i2 = Epk(0) • Epk(0) • Epk(0) • Epk(1)
= Epk(0 + 0 + 0 + 1)
= Epk(1)
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• i3 = Epk(0) • Epk(1) • Epk(1) • Epk(1)
= Epk(0 + 1 + 1 + 1)
= Epk(3)
• i4 = Epk(1) • Epk(0) • Epk(0) • Epk (1)
= Epk(1 + 0 + 0 + 1)
= Epk(2)
Table 2: Kth Iteration of Database
i1 i2 i3 i4
T1 0 0 0 1
T2 1 0 1 0
T3 1 0 1 0
T4 1 1 1 1
During the next step, C1 and C2 collaborate to compute the frequent item-set based on
secure comparison protocol. This protocol compares the results from i1to i4 with Epk(α).
For example, i1 equal to 3, this encrypted value compares to (α) if the result is one (true),
that means 3 greater than or equal the value of (α). Then, the result 0 (false) or 1(true) will
be sent to C1. In our example, 1,0,1,1 will be sent to C1. That means i2 is not a frequent
item-set because Epk (1) is less than the value of threshold (α). Then, federated cloud find
the frequent item-set for (k+1) from the first iteration: (i1, i2), (i2, i3), (i3, i4), (i1, i3),
(i2, i4), (i1, i4). Since i2 is not the frequent item-set, it will be removed from the second
iteration. Thus, the second iteration will be as follows: (i1, i3), (i3, i4), (i1, i4).
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Then, computing the secure multiplication is as follow:
• T1= Epk(0 • 0) =Epk(0)
• T2= Epk(1 • 1) = Epk(1)
• T3= Epk(1 • 1) = Epk(1)
• T4= Epk (1 •1) =Epk(1)
Then, applying the additive property of Paillier cryptosystem again will give us Epk
(3) which is greater than Epk (α) by using the comparison protocol. Thus, (i1, i3) is
the frequent item-set. Then, applying the same steps on (i3, i4) to determine if it is a
frequent item-set or not.







• T1= Epk (0 • 1) = Epk (0)
• T2= Epk(1 • 0) = Epk (0)
• T3= Epk (1 • 0) = Epk(0)
• T4= Epk (1 • 1) = Epk(1)
Then, applying additive property Epk(0 + 0 + 0 + 1) will give us Epk(1). Based on the
comparison protocol, this value is less than Epk(α). That means (i3, i4) is not the frequent
item-set. So, we have (i1, i3) as frequent item-set.
4.3 Secure Computation of Association Rules
After finding the frequent item-sets, the association rules are computed to discover interest
relationships in large item-sets. The association rules are an expression term of the form
A → B, where A and B are separated item-sets, i.e., A ∩ B = ∅. The power of an
association rule can be determined by support and confidence. We calculated support on
the first stage. Here, we calculate the minimum value of confidence (β) which is determine
how often items in B appear in transactions containing A. We can calculate the value by
this equation: Confidence (A → B) =
Frequency(A,B)
Frequency(A)
To compute all possible rules, C1 first generates empty set, and then computes all values
independently. Next, it computes the confidence of (A → B) by converting the equation to
24
Figure 2: Algorithm for Proposed Model
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linear form (Freq(A,B)) ≥ (Freq(A)∗(β)). Then, C1 andC2 collaborate to apply Secure
Comparison and Secure Multiplication algorithms, so if frequency of (A,B) is greater than
or equal to frequency of (A) multiply by the value of (β), the result will be 1, that means
(Freq(A,B)) is greater than (Freq(A) ∗ β). Then, ( A → B) rule is added to the empty
set. At the end of this stage C1 will have the possible rules. After, computing all possible
rules, the C1 sends the encrypted result of association rules to the end user.
Continuing with the previous example to compute association rules. At the end of the first
phase we have the frequent item-set (i1, i3). Now, we can securely compute the association
rules. First, C1 generates empty-set R. Next, federated cloud compute the confidence of
(i1 → i3) by this equation (Freq(i1, i3)) ≥ (Freq(i1) ∗ (β)). Here on our example, the
value of (Freq(i1, i3)) is 3, and (Freq(i1)) equal to 3, and suppose the value of (β) is 1.
Thus, we have 3 ≥ (3 • 1). After that, C1 and C2 apply secure comparison and secure
multiplication. The final result will be 1. Then, rule (i1 → i3) is added to R.
4.4 Security Comparison
The table below shows a comparative analysis on the data protected using each approach.
Table 5: Security Comparison
Solutions Frequency of Item-set Minimum Threshold Database
Item Privacy χ χ χ
Transaction Privacy χ  χ
Database Privacy χ  
Proposed Solution   
We can see from the table above that the first solution proposed by Xun Yi et al. [14]
leaks some information about the frequency of item-set, minimum threshold and transac-
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tion database. The transaction privacy solution proposed by Xun Yi et al. [14] also leaks
some information about the frequency of item-set and transaction database but the threshold
remains secure because it is encrypted. The third solution is the database privacy which is
also leaks information about the frequency of item-set but protects both minimum thresh-
old and database. However, our proposed model hides support, threshold and database





In this section, we will present our experimental results in detail under different parameters.
We used the Paillier cryptosystem and implemented our protocol using Java on MacOS ma-
chine with 3.3 GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 8 GB of memory. Since it is hard to control
real dataset parameters, we generated random datasets rely on different parameters. By us-
ing these random datasets, we implemented our protocol with more details of computation
costs under different parameters settings. We encrypted these datasets using the Paillier
cryptosystem with fixed encryption key size 1024 and stored these encrypted datasets on
our machine. Then, we executed different queries on these encrypted datasets.
5.2 User Performance
In figure 3, by varying the number of transactions (n) and the number of attributes (m), we
evaluated the computation cost of the encrypted time to outsource the data to cloud for the
given user. We can see that the time of optimizing encryption grows linearly with n andm.
For example, when m = 20, the encryption time increases from 0.26 to 0.34 second when
n is varied from 5000 to 10,000.
5.3 Federated Cloud Performance
In figure 4, by fixing k = 5 and varying the number of transactions (n) and the number
of attributes (m) to find the frequent item-sets, the time also increases linearly with n and
m. Figure 5 illustrates the running time for finding the association rules mining from the
frequent item-sets. We can see that the running time is increased when the number of
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association rules increases. For example, when the number of rules is equal to 1000, the
running time is 133 seconds, and when the number of rules is equal to 2000, the running
time is 266 seconds.
Figure 3: User Computation
Time
Figure 4: Computation Time
of Phase one





Our approach confirms that the association rules remain secure when the owners of data
used a federated cloud to outsource their encrypted data. It makes the value of the thresh-
old and the encrypted data of transaction remain secure. In addition, the cloud servers
or unauthorized users will not be able to know any information about them. To ensure
confidentiality, homomorphic encryption is applied on our framework, which is based on
computing over encrypted data. Also, we applied the Paillier cryptosystem using Secure
Addition, Secure Multiplication, and Secure Comparison to ensure the privacy. Our model
is based on two phases: (a) secure computation of frequent item-sets, and (b) secure com-
putation of association rules mining task in collaborative cloud environment. Then, the
federated cloud returns the association rules mining on aggregated data to end users. Also,
we evaluated the performance of our protocol under different parameter settings. There-
fore, our proposed model provides more security than other models.
6.2 Future Work
Future work in this area mainly includes performance improvements with respect to com-
putation time in the proposed solution. Also, we will try to improve the security. In our
model, we suppose that C1 and C2 are semi-honest which means that all of them follow the
protocol; Therefore, in the future we will extend our protocol to make it secure against ma-
licious protocol. Moreover, we will investigate and extend our research to other complex
queries and real setting over encrypted data.
30
7 References
[1] A. Cavoukian, “Data mining staking a claim on your privacy,” in Computer and Com-
munication Technology (ICCCT), 2012 Third International Conference on.
[2] Amazon, “What is cloud computing?” 2018. [Online]. Available: https:
//aws.amazon.com/what-is-cloud-computing/
[3] A. S. J. T. Michael Hogan, Fang Liu, "NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap",
2011.
[4] M. Kuribayashi and H. Tanaka, “Fingerprinting protocol for images based on additive
homomorphic property,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 14, no. 12, pp.
2129–2139, 2005.
[5] M. Bibi, R. Mehboob, S. Shabbir, and S. Khalid, “Data mining in cloud computing
applications,” 2015.
[6] D. Flair, “Clustering in data mining.” [Online]. Available: https://data-flair.training/
blogs/cluster-analysis-data-mining/
[7] S. Saxena, “Basic concept of classification (data mining), url =
https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/basic-concept-classification-data-mining/.”
[8] K. Borne, “Association rule mining – not your typical data science algorithm),
url = https://mapr.com/blog/association-rule-mining-not-your-typical-data-science-
algorithm/.”
[9] B. K. Samanthula, “Privacy-preserving outsourced collaborative frequent itemset
mining in the cloud,” in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data).
IEEE, 2017, pp. 4827–4829.
[10] O. Goldreich, “The foundations of cryptography, vol. 2. general cryptographic proto-
cols, chap,” 2004.
[11] W. K. Wong, D. W. Cheung, E. Hung, B. Kao, and N. Mamoulis, “Security in out-
sourcing of association rule mining,” in Proceedings of the 33rd international confer-
ence on Very large data bases. VLDB Endowment, 2007, pp. 111–122.
[12] C.-H. Tai, P. S. Yu, andM.-S. Chen, “k-support anonymity based on pseudo taxonomy
for outsourcing of frequent itemset mining,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGKDD
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining. ACM, 2010, pp.
473–482.
31
[13] F. Giannotti, L. V. Lakshmanan, A. Monreale, D. Pedreschi, and H. Wang, “Privacy-
preserving mining of association rules from outsourced transaction databases,” IEEE
Systems Journal, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 385–395, 2013.
[14] X. Yi, F.-Y. Rao, E. Bertino, and A. Bouguettaya, “Privacy-preserving association
rule mining in cloud computing,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM symposium on
information, computer and communications security. ACM, 2015, pp. 439–450.
[15] R. S. Agrawal and R. Srikant, “R. fast algorithms for mining association rules,” in
Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, VLDB,
1994, pp. 487–499.
[16] X. Yi, R. Paulet, and E. Bertino, Homomorphic encryption and applications.
Springer, 2014, vol. 3.
[17] P. Paillier, “Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes,”
in International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Tech-
niques. Springer, 1999, pp. 223–238.
[18] Y. Elmehdwi, B. K. Samanthula, and W. Jiang, “Secure k-nearest neighbor query
over encrypted data in outsourced environments,” in 2014 IEEE 30th International
Conference on Data Engineering. IEEE, 2014, pp. 664–675.
[19] B. K. Samanthula, H. Chun, and W. Jiang, “An efficient and probabilistic secure bit-
decomposition,” in Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information,
computer and communications security. ACM, 2013, pp. 541–546.
32
